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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVII DECEMBER, 1931 No. 1
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SECTIONS 75-84,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSt
By TYRRELL WILLIAMS
TOPIC C. Consideration and Its Sufficiency
Section 75. DEFINITION OF CONSIDERATION.
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal rela-
tion, or
(d) a return promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
(2) Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some
other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other
person.
Comment:
a. The law generally imposes no duty on one who makes an
informal promise unless the promise is supported by sufficient
consideration (see Section 19).
b. This Restatement distinguishes the two questions: whether
there is consideration for a promise, and whether that considera-
tion is sufficient. This Section defines consideration in effect as
* Copyright, 1928, The American Law Institute.
t Copyright, 1931, by Washington University. Previous sections of the
Restatement, similarly annotated, will be found in the ST. Louis LAw RE-
vxnw for December, 1930, February, 1931, and June, 1931.
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the price bargained for and paid for a promise, and in connec-
tion with Section 19 states the principle that, subject to certain
exceptions, an informal promise is not binding unless an agreed
price has been paid for it. Consideration must actually be bar-
gained for as the exchange for the promise. A statement that a
consideration has been bargained for does not conclusively prove
the fact. Recital of a payment not in fact made, but stated to
have been made as consideration, the statement being inserted
merely to make a transaction look like a bargain when in fact it
was not a bargain, does not suffice. The existence or non-ex-
istence of a bargain where something has been parted with by
the promisee or received by the promisor depends upon the mani-
fested intention of the parties.
c. Furthermore, although a price has been agreed upon and
paid for a promise, the promise is not binding unless the law
deems the price sufficient. The following Sections state when
an agreed price or consideration for a promise is sufficient to
make the promise binding and when such a price or considera-
tion is insufficient. The fact that the promisee relies on the
promise to his injury, or the promisor gains some advantage
therefrom, does not establish consideration without the element
of bargain or agreed exchange; but some informal promises are
enforceable without the element of bargain. These fall and are
placed in the category of contracts which are binding without
assent or consideration (see Topic D, Sections 85-94).
d. In unilateral contracts the consideration is something other
than a promise. It may be a specified act or forbearance, or any
one of several specified acts or forbearances of which the offeree
is given the choice, or such conduct as will produce a specified
result. The offeror may also offer or request as consideration
the creation, modification or destruction of a purely intangible
legal relation. Not infrequently the consideration bargained
for is an act with the added requirement that a certain legal re-
sult shall be produced. In bilateral contracts the consideration
is a return promise. What amounts to a promise is defined in
Section 2. Consideration may consist partly of promises and
partly of other acts or forbearances. Though a promise is itself
an act, it is in this connection distinguished from all other acts.
e. It matters not from whom the consideration moves or to
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whom it goes. If it is bargained for as the exchange for the
promise, the promise is not gratuitous.
Illustfations of Subsection (1):
1. A requests B to give him a book, promising B $10 in
exchange therefor; or B offers the book in exchange for A's
promise to pay $10. In either case, if the book is given and
received, there is consideration for A's promise.
2. A promises B $500 when B goes to college. If the
promise is not made as an agreed exchange for B's going to
college but is reasonably to be understood as a gratuity, pay-
able on the stated contingency, B's going to college is not
consideration for A's promise.
3. A says to B, the owner of a garage, "I will pay you
$100 if you will make my car run properly." The produc-
tion of this result is the requested consideration.
4. A has B's horse in his possession. B writes to A, "If
you will promise me $500 for the horse, he is yours." A
promptly replies making the requested promise. The prop-
erty in the horse at once passes to A. The change in owner-
ship is consideration for A's promise.
Illustrations of Subsection (2):
5. A promises B to guarantee payment of a bill of goods
if B sells the goods to C. Selling the goods to C is considera-
tion for A's promise.
6. A makes a promissory note payable to B in return for
payment by B to C. The payment is consideration for the
note.
7. A, at C's request and in exchange for $1 paid by C,
promises B to give him a book. The payment is considera-
tion for A's promise.
8. A promises B to pay B $1, in exchange for C's promise
to A to give A a book. The promises are consideration for
one another.
Annotation:
This Section is in general accord with Missouri law. A
definition of consideration often approved by Missouri courts is
"a benefit to the party promising or to a third person at his re-
quest, or an inconvenience, loss or injury, or the risk of it, to
the party promised." Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1906)
197 Mo. 616, 95 S. W. 851; Greene v. Higham (1901) 161 Mo.
333, 61 S. W. 798. For a comprehensive description of con-
sideration in both. unilateral and bilateral contracts, see German
v. Gilbert (1900) 83 Mo. App. 411. Allen West Commission Co.
v. Richter (1921) 286 Mo. 691, 228 S. W. 827, is authority for
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the Restatement's assertion that the alleged consideration is not
binding consideration unless it is "bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise." To the same effect: Glasscock v.
Glasscock (1877) 66 Mo. 627.
Subdivision (1), Clause (a) is illustrated by Powell v. Rail-
road (1914) 225 Mo. 420, 164 S. W. 628, issuing a pass; Under-
wood Typewriter v. Century Building Co. (1909) 220 Mo. 522,
119 S. W. 400, act of obtaining a satisfactory tenant; Stone v.
Pennock (1888) 31 Mo. App. 544, performing services as nurse.
Subdivision (1), Clause (b) is illustrated by Brandenburger
v. Puller (1916) 266 Mo. 534, 181 S. W. 1141, refraining from
the contest of a will; Bridges v. Stephens (1896) 132 Mo. 524, 34
S. W. 555, forbearing to sue held consideration for oral promise
not to plead statute of limitations; Rinehart v. Bills (1884) 82
Mo. 534, compromise case, the court saying "the compromise of a
doubtful claim asserted in good faith furnishes a valuable con-
sideration to support a promise"; Lindell ,v. Rokes (1875) 60 Mo.
249, forbearing to use intoxicating liquors for eight months;
Hughes v. Foltz (1910) 142 Mo. App. 513, 127 S. W. 112, with-
drawing claim to purchase certain property; Hill v. Railroad Co.
(1899) 82 Mo. App. 188, delaying legal proceedings for loss of a
COW.
Subdivision (1), Clause (c) is illustrated by Scriba v. Neely
(1908) 130 Mo. App. 258, 109 S. W. 845, giving up a contract
right; Gunnell v. Emerson (1898) 73 Mo. App. 291, abandoning
equitable right to redeem mortgaged chattels; Lancaster v. Elliot
(1893) 55 Mo. App. 249, ielease of right to recover interest on
judgment.
Subdivision (1), Clause (d) is illustrated by Green v. Whaley
(1917) 271 Mo. 636, 197 S. W. 355, contract between joint own-
ers of property as to final disposition thereof, the court saying
"the promise of one was a sufficient consideration for the prom-
ise of the other"; Moss v. Green (1867) 41 Mo. 389, mutual
promises to pay money upon happening of fortuitous events;
Maccalum Printing Co. v. Graphite Compendius Co. (1910) 150
Mo. App. 383, 130 S. W. 836, bilateral contract for commercial
printing; Young v. Ruhwedel (1906) 119 Mo. App. 231, 96 S. W.
228, contract of owner to sell supported by promise of plaintiff
to act as agent.
Subdivision (2). In Sears v. Krekel (Mo. App. 1916) 184
S. W. 911, the consideration was the purchase of land from a
third party after defendant promised plaintiff to pay taxes on
the land. In Crow v. Abernathy (1913) 171 Mo. App. 227, 156
S. W. 494, the consideration was given by promisee to a third
person and supported a valid sale of lumber from promisor. In
Webster v. Switzer (1884) 15 Mo. App. 346, the consideration
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was given by promisee to a trust estate at request of trustee and
promisor who was held liable individually.
Section 76. WHAT ACTS OR FORBEARANCES ARE SUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION.
Any consideration that is not a promise is sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of Section 19 (c), except the following:
(a) An act or forbearance required by a legal duty that is
neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable dispute
if the duty is owed either to the promisor or to the public, or, if
imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed to any person;
(b) The surrender of, or forbearance to assert, an invalid claim
or defense by one who has not an honest and reasonable belief in
its possible validity;
(c) The transfer of money or fungible goods as consideration
for a promise to transfer at the same time and place a larger
amount of money or goods of the same kind and quality.
Comment:
a. Section 75 defines consideration. The present Section
states what consideration is legally sufficient to support a uni-
lateral contract. Legal sufficiency does not depend upon the
comparative economic value of the consideration and of what is
promised in return (see Section 81).
b. The satisfaction of the requirement of the sufficiency of
consideration, which is stated in Section 19 (c) as a requisite
for the formation of an informal contract, is but one of the req-
uisites enumerated in that Section. It is, however, with that
requisite alone that the present Topic (Sections 75-84) deals.
The effect of illegality of the consideration will be stated in a
later portion of the Restatement of this Subject.
c. The duty referred to in this Section is confined to a duty for
which any remedy ordinarily allowed by the law for that kind
of duty is still available. One who may at will avoid a legal re-
lation or refrain from any performance without legal conse-
quences, or against whom all remedies appropriate to the en-
forcement of his duty have become barred, is not under a duty
within the meaning of the Section.
Iluatration. :
1. In a State where the law permits a husband and wife to
contract with one another, and to sue upon a contract so
Washington University Open Scholarship
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made, A's wife, B, leaves him without just cause. A prom-
ises to pay B $1000 if she will return. Induced thereby, B
returns. Her return is not sufficient consideration.
2. A, an infant, promises B to pay B $50 for a set of
books which A does not need. B delivers the books. A be-
comes of age and threatens to rescind the bargain, as the
law permits him to do. B promises A that if A will pay the
$50 as originally agreed, B will give A another book. A
induced thereby pays the $50. The payment is sufficient
consideration.
3. A sells goods to B who becomes indebted therefor in
the sum of $100. The Statute of Limitations bars any
remedy of A to recover the debt. A promises B that if B
will pay the debt, A will give B a specified book. B pays the
debt. The payment is sufficient consideration.
4. A owes B a debt which is unliquidated, or of which
either the existence or amount is honestly and reasonably
disputed. A payment of any amount by A is sufficient con-
sideration for B's agreement to accept it in full satisfaction.
5. A owes B a liquidated and undisputed debt of $100. B
has also another claim against A, the existence or amount of
which is honestly and reasonably disputed by A. A pays B
$100 in return for B's agreement to accept the payment in
full satisfaction of both claims. There is not sufficient con-
sideration for B's agreement, since A has paid only what he
was under a duty to pay.
6. A owes B a liquidated sum. Any payment by A at an
earlier time, or in a different medium from that required by
the duty, is sufficient consideration for B's promise to ac-
cept it in full satisfaction if the difference in performance is
part of what is requested and given in exchange for the
promise.
7. A owes B a matured liquidated debt bearing interest.
Mutual promises to extend the debt for a year are binding,
though the rate of interest is below that which the law al-
lows on overdue debts for which no interest has been con-
tracted. A might have paid the debt and altogether pre-
vented B from acquiring a right to interest.
8. A enters into a contract with B to build a house, ac-
cording to certain plans, for ten thousand dollars, which B
agrees to pay. When the work is half done A finds that he
will lose money by performing the contract, and informs B
that the work will stop unless B promises to pay two thou-
sand dollars additional for its completion. B makes the prom-
ise and A thereupon completes the building. There is no
sufficient consideration for B's promise to pay the additional
sum. If unforeseen difficulties justifying A in rescinding
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the contract exist, there is sufficient consideration for a
promise of additional payment.
Annotation:
This section relates to unilateral contracts, and seems to be in
accord with Missouri law. The general rule is in favor of suffi-
cient consideration. See annotation under Section 75. Three
important exceptions to the general rule are stated in the subdi-
visions of this section.
The exception of Subdivision (a) is illustrated by Lingenfelder
v. Wainwright Brewery Co. (1891) 103 Mo. 578, 15 S. W. 844
(leading case), where plaintiff, an engaged architect, by refus-
ing to continue performance, exacted an additional promise from
defendant; held no sufficient consideration. A certain separation
agreement between husband and wife held invalid. In re Estate
of Wood (1921) 288 Mo. 588, 232 S. W. 671. Part payment of
money due is no consideration for postponing payment of resi-
due. Price v. Cannon (1834) 3 Mo. 453. It is the legal duty of
police to make arrests. Kick v. Merry (1856) 23 Mo. 72, and
Thornton v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1890) 42 Mo. App. 58. Two al-
leged contracts relating to reorganization of a corporation; held
no consideration for promise in second contract because of first
contract. Brown ,v. Irving (Mo. App. 1925) 269 S. W. 686.
Promise by landlord inducing tenant not to break lease is with-
out consideration. Hunter Land & Development Co. v. Watson
(Mo. App. 1922) 236 S. W. 670. Executor became attorney for
estate; no consideration for promise of beneficiary to pay for
services. Orr v. Sanford (1898) 74 Mo. App. 187. Promisee
was railroad company having right of way in public street; held
no consideration for promise of contractor to pay for extra sup-
port of tracks during sewer construction. Kansas City, St. J.
& C. B. Ry. Co. v. Morley (1891) 45 Mo. App. 304.
Subdivision (b). In Long v. Towl (1868) 42 Mo. 545, the al-
leged consideration, dismissal of suits palpably unjust, was held
to be insufficient. In the following cases the consideration al-
though challenged was held to be sufficient. Mullanphy v. Riley
(1847) 10 Mo. 489, withholding claim against estate in probate;
Livingston v. Dugan (1854) 20 Mo. 102, payment for medical at-
tention to slave of doubtful ownership as between plaintiff and
defendant; Vale v. Picton (1884) 16 Mo. App. 178, contract be-
tween wife's husband and father in settlement of doubtful claim;
Harms v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. (1913) 172 Mo. App.
241, 157 S. W. 1046, insurance case involving settlement of dis-
puted claim.
The principle of Subdivision (e) is stated in Wetmore v.
Crouch (1899) 150 Mo. 671, 51 S. W. 738, as follows: "A trans-
action which consists only in the payment of a smaller sum than
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is unquestionably due, and which has no other element of ac-
cord in it, is not a satisfaction of the debt even though accepted
as such at the time." A part payment of a judgment debt is not
a discharge even if so intended. Winter v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co.
(1901) 160 Mo. 159, 61 S. W. 606. The principle of the subdi-
vision was pointed out but facts indicated valid compromises in
the following cases: Pollman & Bros. Coal & Sprinkling Co. v.
City of St. Louis (1898) 145 Mo. 651, 47 S. W. 563; Chamberlain
v. Smith (1905) 110 Mo. App. 657, 85 S. W. 645.
Section 77. A PROMISE Is GENERALLY SUFFICIENT CONSIDER-
ATION.
Except as qualified by Sections 78, 79 and 80, any promise
whether absolute or conditional is a sufficient consideration.
Comment:
a. This Section in connection with Sections 78, 79 and 80
states what consideration is sufficient in a bilateral contract.
b. Where promises are exchanged, one or both of them may be
conditional, and though the condition of a promise may never
happen, and in that event the promisor will not violate his
promise if he does nothing, this alone does not prevent the prom-
ise from being sufficient consideration. Such conditional prom-
ises as are insufficient consideration are defined in Sections 78
and 79.
Within the definition of consideration in Section 75, taken in
connection with Section 77, a promise by A to B is sufficient con-
sideration for a promise by B to C (see Illustration 8 under Sec-
tion 75).
Annotation:
This section relates to bilateral contracts, and is not incon-
sistent with Missouri law. Anderson v. Gaines (1900) 156 Mo.
664, 57 S. W. 726, was a suit in equity to set aside a deed to land
given in consideration of a promise by an insolvent defendant to
support plaintiff; held that the promise was a sufficient con-
sideration in the absence of fraud. Maccalum Printing Co. v.
Graphite Compendius Co. (1910) 150 Mo. App. 383, 130 S. W.
836, involved a binding bilateral contract to print one catalogue
and also subsequent ones "if the price of plaintiff was no higher
than that of other responsible firms." See also German v. Gil-
bert (1900) 83 Mo. App. 411, a conditional promise to bid at a
mortgage sale held a sufficient consideration.
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Section 78. A PROMISE IS INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION IF
ITS PERFORMANCE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INSUFFICIENT.
A promise is insufficient consideration if the promisor knows
or has reason to know at the time of making the promise that it
can be performed by some act or forbearance which would be in-
sufficient consideration for a unilateral contract.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is applicable, though but for
the return promise the promisor would not have done what he
has promised, or though for lack of money or for other reason he
is unable to do so.
Illustrations:
1. A's promise to pay a debt to B, his promise to perform
an existing contractual duty' to B, his promise to perform
his official duty, his promise to refrain from committing a
tort against B or against a third person (A having no hon-
est and reasonable doubt as to the facts on which his duty
depends), are all insufficient considerations for a promise by
B, though but for B's promise A would not have fulfilled his
previous duty.
2. A promises B to surrender or to forbear suit upon an
invalid claim either against B or against C, which A does
not honestly and reasonably believe has possible validity.
In either case A's promise is insufficient consideration for a
promise by B.
Annotation:
This section is in accord with Missouri law. See cases cited in
annotation under Section 76. See also Smith v. Sickenger (Mo.
App. 1918) 202 S. W. 262, where the lessor of a farm, rent to be
paid out of crops, by a promise to do what was right, induced the
lessee to replant after a flood; the promise was an insufficient
consideration.
Section 79. A PROMISE IN THE ALTERNATIVE AS CONSIDERATION.
A promise or apparent promise which reserves by its terms to
the promisor the privilege of alternative courses of conduct is in-
sufficient consideration if any of these courses of conduct would
be insufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for.
Comment:
a. This Section is applicable to two classes of promises. In
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one class the promisor undertakes to give any one of several
performances, each of which is in a greater or less degree an ob-
ject of desire to the promisee. In the other class of cases one
performance only is an object of such desire, but another course
of conduct by the terms of the promise is permissible to the
promisor in case he deems it for his advantage to adopt that
course. In both cases the promise is sufficient consideration if
it cannot be kept without some action or forbearance which
would be sufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for.
b. Under the definition of "promise" in Section 2, words that
state an undertaking to do something if the "promisor" so de-
sires are apparently a promise, but not a promise in fact.
Illustrations:,
1. A promises B to act as B's agent for three years on cer-
tain terms, and B agrees that A may so act, but reserves the
power to cancel the agreement at any time. B's agreement
is insufficient consideration, since it involves nothing that
can properly be called a promise. Otherwise, if B reserves
the power to cancel on thirty days' notice.
2. A promises to sell B a certain quantity of goods which
A has on hand, unless A should decide not to sell the goods
to anyone. This promise is sufficient consideration for a
return promise. Though A may refuse to sell to B, he can-
not then keep his promise except by not selling to anyone.
This itself would be sufficient consideration if it were bar-
gained for.
3. A offers to deliver to B at $2 a bushel as many bushels
of wheat, not exceeding 5000, as B may choose to order
within the next thirty days. B accepts, agreeing to buy at
that price as much as he shall order of A within the specified
time. B's acceptance involves no promise by him, and is not
sufficient consideration.
4. A offers to deliver to B at $2 a bushel as many bushels
of wheat, not exceeding 5000, as B may choose to order
within the next thirty days, if B will promise to order at
least 1000 bushels within that time. B accepts. There is a
contract. B's promise reserves only a limited option and
cannot be performed without doing something which would
be sufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for.
5. A promises either to give B a book or to pay a liqui-
dated, undisputed and matured debt which A owes to B.
A's promise is insufficient consideration for a return prom-
ise by B.
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Annotation:
This section is in accord with Missouri law, but attention
should be paid to principles rather than terminology. See an-
notation under Section 30 for occasional use in Missouri of
word unilateral as indicating insufficiency of promise as con-
sideration. See also annotation under Section 32 for discussion
of contracts to supply needs or wishes.
A promise to pay for cream if delivered is not a contract in
the absence of a definite promise to deliver cream. Halloway v.
Mountain Grove Creamery Co. (1921) 286 Mo. 489, 228 S. W.
451. A certain promise to cut railroad ties was held too vague
and uncertain to support a bilateral contract. Hudson v. Brown-
ing (1915) 264 Mo. 58, 174 S. W. 393. For comment on this
case see 9 UNIV. OF Mo. LAW BULLETIN 38. A freight contract
is not supported by a sufficient consideration in the absence of a
definite promise to ship. Steffen v. Mississippi River & B. T.
Ry. Co. (1900) 156 Mo. 322, 56 S. W. 1125. To the same general
effect: Barnes v. Bragg (Mo. App. 1917) 198 S. W. 73, and
Campbell v. American Handle Co. (1906) 117 Mfo. App. 19, 94
S. W. 815.
Section 80. A PROMISE WHICH IS NOT BINDING Is GENERALLY
INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.
Except as stated in Section 84 (e), a promise which is neither
binding nor capable of becoming binding by acceptance of its
terms is insufficient consideration, unless its invalidity is caused
by illegality due solely to facts that the promisor neither knows
nor has reason to know.
Comment:
a. The ultimate basis of the legal requirement of sufficient
consideration for promises is the belief not only that something
should be given in exchange for a promise in order to make it
binding, but that what is given should have value, although the
test of value for determining the sufficiency of consideration
does not completely correspond with value in fact, either as
measured by the opinion of mankind or by the opinion of the
parties to the transaction.
b. A promise which is neither binding nor, like the promise
in an offer, capable of becoming binding by acceptance of its
terms, is regarded by the law as of no value. Therefore, a prom-
ise in a bilateral agreement which falls within this category is
insufficient consideration for a return promise, and the whole
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agreement is inoperative. One of the promises may have such
a defect and bring about this result:
i. because of total incapacity to contract on the part of the
promisor, or
ii. because of such illegality or prohibition of the law as
makes a promise entirely inoperative, or
iii. because the promise itself is not supported by sufficient
consideration.
Illustrations:
1. In a State where the promise of a married woman to
become surety for her husband is void, A, a married woman,
makes a bilateral agreement with B, her only promise being
to become surety for her husband. There is no contract.
2. In a State where the promise of a lunatic under guard-
ianship is void, A, such a lunatic, makes a bilateral agree-
ment with B. There is no contract.
3. In a State where the Statute of Frauds makes an oral
promise to sell land void, not merely unenforceable, A prom-
ises orally to sell Blackacre to B, and B promises to pay
$5000 for it. There is no contract.
4. A promises B a book in return for B's promise to pay
A a liquidated debt B owes him. B's promise is insufficient
consideration for A's, and therefore A's promise is not bind-
ing. In consequence, B's promise also is without sufficient
consideration.
5. A, a married man, and B, an unmarried woman, make
mutual promises to marry. B neither knows nor has rea-
son to know that A is married. B's promise is sufficient con-
sideration and B may recover damages from A for breach of
his promise though B would have a defence to a similar ac-
tion by A.
6. A promises B $100 in return for B's promise to cut
timber on Blackacre, upon which A is a trespasser. B
neither knows nor has reason to know that A has no right to
have the timber cut. B's promise is sufficient consideration
and B may recover damages from A for breach of his prom-
ise though B would have a defence to a similar action by A.
Annotation:
This section relates to bilateral contracts and is not incon-
sistent with Missouri law. An agreement for a prize fight in
violation of statute is not a contract. Reisler 'v. Dempsey (1921)
207 Mo. App. 182, 232 S. W. 229. Promise to "compromise" a
"claim" that has no merit and is not doubtful is not binding.
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McCrary v. Thompson (1907) 123 Mo. App. 596, 100 S. W. 535.
Promisor incapacitated by drunkenness and so known topromisee,
is not bound. Longhead v. Combs and Bro. Commission Co.(1896) 64 Mo. App. 559.
Section 81. ADEQUACY OF VALUE OF CONSIDERATION IS IM-
MATERIAL.
Except as this rule is qualified by Sections 76, 78, 79 and 80,
gain or advantage to the promisor or loss or disadvantage to the
promisee, or the relative values of a promise and the considera-
tion for it, do not affect the sufficiency of consideration.
Comment:
a. Although, as stated in the Comment to Section 80, some
conception of value forms the basis of the legal requirement of
sufficient consideration, it is a general rule, subject to the quali-
fications referred to in this Section, that whatever consideration
a promisor assents to as the price of his promise, is legally suffi-
cient consideration. But the fact that the value of what is stated
as consideration is insignificant as compared with the value of
what is promised in exchange is evidence, and under some cir-
cumstances may amount to convincing evidence, that the trans-
action is not a bargain but rather a promise to make a gift, and
that it is, therefore, not a promise for sufficient consideration.
Illustrations:
1. A, from motives of pity for animal suffering, promises
B $10 for a broken-legged horse which B had thought worth-
less and would have gladly given $10 to have A remove.
The transfer of the horse to A is a sufficient consideration
for A's promise.
2. A believes a letter in B's possession will enable him to
establish a claim against C. A offers B $1000 for the letter.
B accepts and gives A the letter, which proves insufficient to
establish the claim. The letter is sufficient consideration
for A's promise.
Annotation:
This section is in accord with Missouri law. "It is not neces-
sary that the consideration should be adequate in point of value.
Although small or even nominal, in the absence of fraud, it is
enough to support a contract entered into upon the faith of it."
Strong v. Whybark (1907) 204 Mo. 341, 102 S. W. 968. The
principle is illustrated by Williams v. Jensen (1882) 75 Mo. 681,
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decided before the present married woman's statute was passed.
A married woman without a separate estate was induced to sign
a note. The obtaining of this signature was a consideration for
a promise, the court saying: "It may have been an inconvenience
for Stonebreaker to secure the signature of his wife and this
much appearing the law will shut its eyes to the inequality be-
tween the consideration and the promise." Other cases in sup-
port of the principle are: Campbell v. McLaughlin (Mo. 1918)
205 S. W. 18; Bean v. Valle (1829) 2 Mo. 126; Forbs v. St. Louis
I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1904) 107 Mo. App. 661, 82 S. W. 562.
Smallness of consideration is not of itself evidence of fraud,
but is a circumstance to be weighed with others in determining
the question of fraud. Chouteau v. Nuckolls (1855) 20 Mo. 442.
As to the distinction between inadequacy of consideration and
total failure of consideration, see Lindsay v. Sonora Gold Min.
& Mill. Co. (Mo. 1917) 196 S. W. 764, and Brown v. Weldon &
Lankford (1887) 27 Mo. App. 251.
Section 82. A RECITAL OF CONSIDERATION Is NOT CONCLUSIVE
PROOF.
A recital in a written agreement that a stated consideration
other than a promise has been given as consideration is not con-
clusive proof of the fact.
Comment:
a. The parol evidence rule does not prevent denial of the truth
of statements of fact contained in a written agreement, except
statements that the promises contained in the agreement have
been made. The rule forbids (see Section 238) proof that a
promise stated in a written agreement was not made in those
terms.
Illustrations:
1. A writing is signed by A and accepted by B, which
reads: "In consideration of one dollar to me in hand paid
by B, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I guar-
antee that the thousand dollars advanced yesterday to C by
B, shall be duly repaid." A may show that a dollar was
neither paid nor expected to be paid by B, and that his
promise is, therefore, not binding; but if the dollar was paid
it is sufficient consideration since the parties have mani-
fested an intention to make a bargain. B may prove, if the
facts warrant it, that some sufficient consideration, other
than that recited (as, for example, forbearance) was bar-
gained for and given.
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2. A written agreement made by A and B states that in
consideration of A's promise not to use intoxicating liquor,
B promises to pay him $5000. Neither A nor B may intro-
duce evidence to show that he never made the promise stated
in the writing as made by him.
Annotation:
This section is in accord with Missouri decisions. McDaniel V.
United Rys. Co. (1912) 165 Mo. App. 678, 148 S. W. 464, in-
volved the construction of an alleged release of a personal injury
claim. It was held that the consideration clause was a "mere re-
cital of facts" and not "contractual"; therefore parol evidence
was admissible. The case makes plain the distinction between
the Restatement's Illustration 1 (mere recital of fact) and Illus-
tration 2 (contractual). The same distinction is recognized in
Neville v. Hughes (1904) 104 Mo. App. 455, 79 S. W. 735, a suit
on an alleged breach of warranty, where it was held that the con-
sideration clause was "contractual"; therefore parol evidence
was not admissible. To the same effect is General Accident & L.
Insurance Co. v. Owen Bldg. Co. (1917) 195 Mo. App. 371, 192
S. W. 145, where the consideration being a promise, parol evi-
dence was inadmissible. See also Poplin v. Brown (1918) 200
Mo. App. 255, 205 S. W. 411, a replevin suit, where parol evi-
dence was admitted to show real character of a bill of sale.
In Moore v. Ringo (1884) 82 Mo. 468, the court said: "Where
a consideration has been inserted in an executory contract which
is shown to be nominal or unreal, the real consideration may be
shown for the purpose of supporting the contract."
Section 83. ONE CONSIDERATION MAY SUPPORT A NUMBER OF
PROMISES.
Consideration is sufficient for as many promises as are bar-
gained for and given in exchange for it if it would be sufficient:
(a) for each one of them if that alone were bargained for, or
(b) for at least one of them, and its insufficiency as considera-
tion for any of the others is due solely to the fact that it is itself
a promise for which the return promise would not be a sufficient
consideration.
Illustrations:
1. A pays B or promises B to pay him $5, not then owed
by A, in consideration of which B promises A to give him a
book and also promises to surrender a letter. Both of B's
promises are supported by sufficient consideration.
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2. A pays B or promises B to pay him $50 not then owed
by A, in exchange for the following promises: a promise by
C to dig a well for D, a promise by E to discharge F from a
debt of $100 owing by F to E. All the promises are sup-
ported by sufficient consideration.
3. A promises to pay B $1000 in exchange for B's prom-
ises to complete a building B is then under an existing duty
to A to complete, and to do other specified work. Though
A's promise would be insufficient consideration for B's
promise to complete the building if that promise were the
only one made by B, since both parties to a bilateral agree-
ment must be bound or neither is bound, B's additional
promise removes the obstacle and both B's promises are
supported by sufficient consideration.
Annotation:
This section is in accord with Missouri law.
Subdivision (a). Tebeau v. Ridge (1914) 261 Mo. 547, 170
S. W. 871, lease of land containing option to purchase, rent re-
served being only consideration. See also Luthy v. Woods
(1878) 6 Mo. App. 67.
Subdivision (b). A lawful promise to pay for services, made
by corporate defendant based upon a lawful consideration, is not
invalid because the defendant made at the same time an unlawful
promise, to purchase its own stock, based upon the same con-
sideration. Sexton v. North Mo. Cent. Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1917)
194 S. W. 1082. See also Presbury v. Fisher (1853) 18 Mo. 50.
Section 84. APPLICATION OF RULES TO A NUMBER OF SPECIAL
CASES.
Consideration is not insufficient because of the fact
(a) that obtaining it was not the motive or a material cause in-
ducing the promisor to make the promise, or
(b) that part of it does not fulfill the requirements of suffi-
ciency, or
(c) that the party giving the consideration is then bound by a
duty owed to the promisor or to the public, or by any duty im-
posed by the law of torts or crimes, to render some performance
similar to that given or promised, if the act or forbearance given
or promised as consideration differs in any way from what was
previously due, or
(d) that the party giving the consideration is then bound by
a contractual or quasi-contractual duty to a third person to per-
form the act or forbearance given or promised as consideration, or
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(e) that it is a promise, and a special privilege not expressly
reserved in the promise but given by the law, makes the promise
or the whole agreement unenforceable or voidable, or
(f) that it is a promise, performance of which is conditional
on either a future or past event, if when the promise is made
there is any possibility, or there would seem to a reasonable man
in the position of the promisor to be any possibility, that the
promise can be performed only by some act or forbearance which
would be sufficient consideration.
Comment:
a. The various circumstances set out in the Subsections of this
Section are specifically stated for the purpose of amplifying
general rules stated in previous Sections with reference to ques-
tions which have most frequently raised controversy.
Comment on Clause (a):
b. As it is the intent of the parties as manifested to one
another which determines whether consideration is given in ex-
change for a promise, it follows that if such an intent is mani-
fested, the motive or the cause is immaterial.
Illustration of Clause (a):
1. A wishes to make a binding promise to his son B, to
convey to B, Blackacre, which is worth $5000. Being ad-
vised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A writes to
B an offer to sell Blackacre for $1. B accepts. B's promise
to pay $1 is sufficient consideration.
Comment on Clause (b):
c. If something capable of operating as consideration is given,
it matters not that other things also given as consideration are in
themselves insufficient or that the exchange which the promisor
undertakes to give in return is disproportionately great; but if
part of the consideration is illegal the whole agreement may
thereby become invalid.
d. Compositions with creditors fall within this Clause. The
consideration for which each of the assenting creditors bargains
may be any or all of the following: 1. part payment of the sum
due him; 2. the promise of each other creditor to forego a portion
of his claim; 3. forbearance (or promise thereof) by the debtor
to pay the assenting creditors more than equal proportions;
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4. the action of the debtor in securing the assent of the other
creditors; 5. the part payment made to the other creditors. Of
these, number 1 is not a sufficient consideration; but each of the
other four is sufficient. Numbers 4 and 5 are seldom bargained
for in fact; but numbers 2 and 3 are practically always bar-
gained for, by reasonable implication if not in express terms.
Still other considerations may be agreed upon in any case.
Illustrations of Clause (b):
2. A promises B a'book if B will pay A $5 which B owes A,
and $1 in addition. B pays A $6. A's promise is binding,
although B's payment of the $5 which he owes is not of it-
self sufficient consideration.
3. A makes a composition with B, C and D, three of his
creditors, whereby each of them, in consideration of a pay-
ment of forty cents on the dollar and of A's promise to treat
all assenting creditors equally, and in further consideration
of similar promises by the other two of the creditors, prom-
ises to accept the said payment as full satisfaction. The
1st two of the expressed considerations are sufficient and the
composition is valid. It is immaterial whether A has credi-
tors who do not assent, unless B, C and D make their agree-
ments subject to the condition or on the expressed assump-
tion that these creditors likewise enter into the compo-
sition.
Illustration of Clause (c):
4. A, a public official, performs acts requested in an offer
of reward and some of these acts are beyond the scope of
his official duty. He has given sufficient consideration.
Illustration of Clause (d):
5. A owes B $10. C promises that he will give A a book
in return for A's payment of the debt or in return for A's
promise to pay it. The payment or promise of payment is
sufficient consideration.
Comment on Clause (e):
e. Though an unconditional reservation by a promisor of the
privilege of avoiding performance or cancelling his agreement
precludes a promise or apparent promise from being sufficient
consideration, an equally extensive privilege given by the law
without such a reservation has no such effect.
Illustrations of Clause (e):
6. A makes a promise in consideration of a return prom-
ise by B. Though the contract is voidable by A because of
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his own infancy, or because of B's fraud, A's promise is not,
because of that insufficient consideration for B's promise.
7. A makes a promise in consideration of a return prom-
ise by B. Though A's promise is unenforceable (but not
void; see Section 80, Illustration 3) under the Statute of
Frauds, it is not on that account insufficient for B's promise.
8. A makes a bilateral agreement with the United States
Government. The promise of the Government though un-
enforceable is not, because of that, insufficient for A's
promise.
Comment on Clause (t):
f. In dealing with promises contingent on past events the law
takes the standpoint of the promisor. If he honestly, and rea-
sonably from the facts within his knowledge, believes that his
promise does not by its terms permit him to avoid a breach
thereof without some performance which might furnish suffi-
cient consideration, it is immaterial that the facts are such that
there is no such possibility. His honest and reasonable belief
that he will be unable to fulfill a previous legal duty, however,
does not make a promise by him which is contingent on the non-
fulfilment, a sufficient consideration, if it remains legally per-
missible to the promisor to discharge his duty by performing the
previous duty.
Illustrations of Clause (f):
9. A promises B to pay him $5000 if his house burns with-
in a year. This is sufficient consideration for a return
promise.
10. A promises B to pay him $5000 if A enters a com-
peting business within three years. This is a sufficient con-
sideration for a return promise.
11. A promises B to pay him $5000 if B's ship now at
sea has already been lost, the fact being, though unknown to
the promisor, that the ship has not been lost. This is suffi-
cient consideration for a return promise, since it reason-
ably seems to the promisor that keeping his promise may
involve payment of $5000.
12. A owes B, on September 1, an overdue debt of $10,000.
On that day, in return for a promise by B, A promises B to
deliver to B, on October 1, a Ford car, unless A shall pre-
viously pay the debt. A's promise is insufficient considera-
tion, since after making the promise he can avoid breach of
it by paying his debt.
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Annotation'-
This section is in accord with Missouri law, except clause (d),
which is not inconsistent with Missouri law.
(a) The clause is illustrated by Stone v. Pennock (1888) 31
Mo. App. 544; even if plaintiff would have rendered services
without compensation named in contract, this fact cannot pre-
vent plaintiff from recovering.
(b) The principle is illustrated by composition agreements.
Mullin v. Martin (1886) 23 Mo. App. 537. If several considera-
tions are recited and one or more are frivolous but not illegal,
considerations may be severed. Drummond Realty & Inv. Go.
v. Thompson Trust Co. (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 479. In a certain
alleged contract relating to divorce part of the consideration was
illegal and the entire agreement became invalid. Beardsley v.
Bass (1921) 287 .Mo. 393, 229 S. W. 1092. But severable legal
agreements may be enforced though coupled with illegal agree-
ments. Schibi v. Miller (Mo. App. 1925) 268 S. W. 434.
(c) A public officer may accept a reward for services outside
the scope of his duties, such as arresting criminals in other states.
Smith v. Vernon County (1905) 188 Mo. 501, 87 S. W. 949;
Davis v. Milsap (1911) 159 Mo. App. 167, 140 S. W. 751. In
Weber Implement & Auto. Co. v. Goswell (Mo. App. 1927) 299
S. W. 1.52, the promisees, responsible for the price of a mort-
gaged and lost automobile, did more than their legal duty in
finding the automobile. The principle of this clause frequently
is applied to substituted contracts. Mt. Vernon Car Mfg. Co. v.
Hirsch Rolling Mill Co. (1920) 285 Mo. 669, 227 S. W. 67; Davis
v. Culmer (1927) 221 Mo. App. 1037, 295 S. W. 803; Latham v.
Douglass (Mo. App. 1918) 206 S. W. 392; Scriba v. Neely (1908)
130 Mo. App. 258, 109 S. W. 845. The principle was recognized
but was not applied because of facts in State ex rel. v. Cox (Mo.
1923) 251 S. W. 374, and Wilt v. Hammond (1914) 179 Mo. App.
406, 165 S. W. 362.
(d) As above stated, this clause is not inconsistent with Mis-
souri law, but no direct authority has been found for or against
the principle. In Hoffman v. St. Louis Refrigerator & Cold
Storage Co. (1906) 120 Mo. App. 661, 97 S. W. 619, the court
said: "We refrain from passing on the question of whether a
promise to do what the promisor is already under a legal obliga-
tion to do by virtue of a prior contract between him and a third
party, is a good consideration for an undertaking by the prom-
isee to compensate him for doing the thing agreed-whether or
not under those circumstances, an action will lie on the prom-
isee's obligation. This is a question on which the authorities are
in conflict." See also Lindsly & Son v. Kansas City Viaduct &
T. Ry. Co. (1911) 152 Mo. App. 221, 133 S. W. 389.
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(e) The principle frequently is illustrated by cases involving
the Statute of Frauds. "The person making a parol contract to
convey lands, may or may not insist on the protection of the
statute of frauds. If he will confess the agreement, and not in-
sist on the statute, its performance will be enforced against
him." McGowen ,v. West (1842) 7 Mo. 569. Other Statute of
Frauds cases are: St. Louis K. & N. Ry. Co. (1894) 121 Mo. 169,
25 S. W. 192; Aultman and Co. v. Booth (1888) 95 Mo. 383, 8
S. W. 742; Cash v. Wysocki (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 428;
Shannon v. Mastin (Mo. App. 1908) 108 S. W. 1116. The prin-
ciple is also illustrated by those infancy contracts which are
voidable. Baker 'v. Kennett (18-73) 54 Mo. 82; Kerr v. Bell(1869) 44 Mo. 120; Gerkey v. Hampe (Mo. App. 1925) 274 S. W.
510. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2971.
(f) The principle is illustrated by facts in Myers v. Hay(1832) 3 Mo. 98, sale of animal with warranty and promise to
pay liquidated damages in case of breach. See also Wils v.
Forester (1910) 140 Mo. App. 321, 124 S. W. 1090, promise not
to go into business and to pay liquidated damages if promise
broken; Harrington v. Neville (1900) 83 Mo. App. 589, sale of
newspaper with condition subsequent involving promise.
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